It
was Charles Mackay, the 19th-century Scottish
journalist, who observed that men go mad in herds
but only come to their senses one by one.
We
are only at the beginning of the financial world
coming to its senses after the bursting of the
biggest credit bubble the world has seen. Everyone
seems to acknowledge now that there will be lots of
mortgage foreclosures and that house prices will
fall nationally for the first time since the Great
Depression. Some lenders and hedge funds have
failed, while some banks have taken painful
write-offs and fired executives. There's even a
growing recognition that a recession is over the
horizon.
But let me assure you, you ain't seen nothing, yet.
What's important to understand
is that, contrary to what you heard from
President Bush
yesterday, this isn't just a mortgage or housing
crisis. The financial giants that originated,
packaged, rated and insured all those subprime
mortgages were the same ones, run by the same
executives, with the same fee incentives, using the
same financial technologies and risk-management
systems, who originated, packaged, rated and insured
home-equity loans, commercial real estate loans,
credit card loans and loans to finance corporate
buyouts.
It
is highly unlikely that these organizations did a
significantly better job with those other lines of
business than they did with mortgages. But the
extent of those misjudgments will be revealed only
once the economy has slowed, as it surely will.
At
the center of this still-unfolding disaster is the
Collateralized Debt Obligation, or CDO. CDOs are not
new -- they were at the center of a boom and bust in
manufacturing housing loans in the early 2000s. But
in the past several years, the CDO market has
exploded, fueling not only a mortgage boom but
expansion of all manner of credit. By one estimate,
the face value of outstanding CDOs is nearly $2
trillion.
But let's begin with the mortgage-backed CDO.
By
now, almost everyone knows that most mortgages are
no longer held by banks until they are paid off:
They are packaged with other mortgages and sold to
investors much like a bond.
In
the simple version, each investor owned a small
percentage of the entire package and got the same
yield as all the other investors. Then someone
figured out that you could do a bigger business by
selling them off in tranches corresponding to
different levels of credit risk. Under this
arrangement, if any of the mortgages in the pool
defaulted, the riskiest tranche would absorb all the
losses until its entire investment was wiped out,
followed by the next riskiest and the next.
With these tranches, mortgage debt could be divided
among classes of investors. The riskiest tranches --
those with the lowest credit ratings -- were sold to
hedge funds and junk bond funds whose investors
wanted the higher yields that went with the higher
risk. The safest ones, offering lower yields and
Treasury-like AAA ratings, were snapped up by
risk-averse pension funds and money market funds.
The least sought-after tranches were those in the
middle, the "mezzanine" tranches, which offered
middling yields for supposedly moderate risks.
Stick with me now, because this is where it gets
interesting. For it is at this point that the banks
got the bright idea of buying up a bunch of
mezzanine tranches from various pools. Then, using
fancy computer models, they convinced themselves and
the rating agencies that by repeating the same "tranching"
process, they could use these mezzanine-rated assets
to create a new set of securities -- some of them
junk, some mezzanine, but the bulk of them with the
AAA ratings more investors desired.
It was a marvelous piece of
financial alchemy, one that made
Wall Street
banks and the ratings agencies billions of dollars
in fees. And because so much borrowed money was used
-- in buying the original mortgages, buying the
tranches for the CDOs and then in buying the
tranches of the CDOs -- the whole thing was so
highly leveraged that the returns, at least on
paper, were very attractive. No wonder they were
snatched up by British hedge funds, German savings
banks, oil-rich Norwegian villages and
Florida
pension funds.
What we know now, of course, is that the investment
banks and ratings agencies underestimated the risk
that mortgage defaults would rise so dramatically
that even AAA investments could lose their value.
One analysis, by Eidesis Capital, a fund
specializing in CDOs, estimates that, of the CDOs
issued during the peak years of 2006 and 2007,
investors in all but the AAA tranches will lose all
their money, and even those will suffer losses of 6
to 31 percent.
And looking across the sector, J.P. Morgan's CDO
analysts estimate that there will be at least $300
billion in eventual credit losses, the bulk of which
is still hidden from public view. That includes at
least $30 billion in additional write-downs at major
banks and investment houses, and much more at hedge
funds that, for the most part, remain in a state of
denial.
As
part of the unwinding process, the rating agencies
are in the midst of a massive and embarrassing
downgrading process that will force many banks,
pension funds and money market funds to sell their
CDO holdings into a market so bereft of buyers that,
in one recent transaction, a desperate E-Trade was
able to get only 27 cents on the dollar for its
highly rated portfolio.
Meanwhile, banks that are forced to hold on to their
CDO assets will be required to set aside much more
of their own capital as a financial cushion. That
will sharply reduce the money they have available
for making new loans.
And it doesn't stop there. CDO losses now threaten
the AAA ratings of a number of insurance companies
that bought CDO paper or insured against CDO losses.
And because some of those insurers also have
provided insurance to investors in tax-exempt bonds,
states and municipalities have decided to pull back
on new bond offerings because investors have become
skittish.
If
all this sounds like a financial house of cards,
that's because it is. And it is about to come
crashing down, with serious consequences not only
for banks and investors but for the economy as a
whole.
That's not just my opinion. It's why banks are
husbanding their cash and why the outstanding stock
of bank loans and commercial paper is shrinking
dramatically.
It
is why Treasury officials are working overtime on
schemes to stem the tide of mortgage foreclosures
and provide a new vehicle to buy up CDO assets.
It's why state and federal budget officials are
anticipating sharp decreases in tax revenue next
year.
And it is why the
Federal Reserve
is now willing to toss aside concerns about
inflation, the dollar and bailing out Wall Street,
and move aggressively to cut interest rates and pump
additional funds directly into the banking system.
This may not be 1929. But it's a good bet that it's
way more serious than the junk bond crisis of 1987,
the S&L crisis of 1990 or the bursting of the tech
bubble in 2001.